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The emerging global trade and investment regime is a site of ongoing 
contestation between states, powerful industry actors and civil society 
organisations seeking to influence the formation of legal rules, principles, 
practices and institutions. The inclusion of major transnational tobacco, 
alcohol and ultraprocessed food companies seeking to influence 
governments in these processes has resulted in the expanded distribution 
and consumption of unhealthy commodities across the globe, overshadowing 
many of the positive impacts for health hypothesised from liberalised 
trade. The growing number of pathways for market actors to exert undue 
influence over national and international regulatory environments provided 
by agreements, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
for Trans-Pacific Partnership, has given many cause to be concerned. In 
the context of continued commitment by states to international trade and 
investment negotiations, we present several avenues for public health 
scholars, advocates and practitioners to explore to rebalance public and 
private interests in these deals. 
Background
Forged in the aftermath of the two World Wars, the inaugural agreements 
on international trade were heralded as opportunities to develop peace 
between nations through greater economic prosperity and interdependence. 
Recent agreements, however, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), seem to be offering 
much less grandiose terms than earlier promises of peace and prosperity. 
Remarkably, the CPTPP is projected to boost Australia’s real national income 
by a mere $12 billion by 2030 – an annual growth rate of just 0.04%.1 Some 
economists have called for a distinction to be made between ‘free trade’ and 
‘free trade agreements’: the former may reflect optimal economic policy, but 
the latter is increasingly geared at boosting the profits of powerful interest 
groups, such as multinational corporations.2 Given the current state of 
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Trade and investment agreements provide
greater access to, and influence over,
national and international regulatory
policy-making forums for private economic
actors. Simultaneously, economic growth
and higher living standards promised as a
result of these agreements have not been
distributed equitably
Public health scholars, practitioners
and advocates should explore novel
opportunities to protect and promote
public welfare in these agreements, such
as those provided in this commentary,
and build stronger coalitions with those
working towards broader public interest
goals to maximise benefits to human
health
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affairs, we suggest in this commentary that, although 
trade and investment agreements currently prioritise the 
generation of private wealth over public health, there 
are opportunities to rebalance the scales of public and 
private interest in these deals.
The (crumbling) justification for 
international trade agreements
Trade and investment agreements are negotiated on the 
premise that openness to international trade will promote 
economic growth and improve living conditions for all.3 Yet 
many instances of liberalisation in places such as Latin 
America or Africa tell a very different story.4 Three schools 
of thought exist on whether globalising processes, such 
as trade, increase economic growth: that the evidence for 
this relationship is either very strong, quite weak or highly 
dependent on complementary policies (see Samimi and 
Jenatabadi5 for a brief review). Assuming the last of these 
is correct, the distribution of gains among individuals 
in different countries or sectors will be determined by 
factors such as education, innovation, infrastructure, 
institutional and regulatory frameworks, and financial 
development within a country.6 Although understanding 
the distribution of trade gains among the public is vital, it 
is equally important to scrutinise the distribution of these 
gains between the general public and the private market 
actors with front-row tickets to the negotiation table.
Tipping the scales towards 
market actors
The formative agreements of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), along with a complex web of 
bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements 
around the globe, epitomise a process of global 
constitutionalisation: establishing the legal rules, 
principles, procedures, practices and institutions that 
determine both who has power and the scope of that 
power.7 It has been suggested that the emerging global 
trade and investment regime reflects the interests of the 
most powerful states and private economic actors.8-9 
For example, it was striking that the US appointed 
approximately 600 corporate lobbyists as official advisers 
to the US Government during the negotiations for the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (an earlier version of the 
CPTPP)10, thereby granting them privileged access to 
negotiators and negotiating texts. 
One of the key aims of market actors in these 
agreements is regulatory harmonisation (i.e. the 
development of common standards across markets).11 
For example, the CPTPP includes a regulatory coherence 
chapter that indicates that each party should consider 
establishing a national or central coordinating body with 
the power to review national governments’ regulatory 
measures for compliance with “good regulatory 
practices”. Although the language of this chapter is 
hortatory rather than legally binding, and has no recourse 
to dispute settlement, it has raised some concern among 
public interest advocates. It has been noted that civil 
society has limited capacity to effectively participate 
in various rule-making forums relative to industry 
associations and multinational corporations.12 Some 
have concluded that the potential for a limited range 
of stakeholders to unduly influence the rule-making 
process “could not only curtail the regulatory autonomy 
of governments to act in the public interest, but also 
pose credible threats to both distributional justice and 
democratic legitimacy”.13
Arguably, though, one of the most striking examples 
of the growing imbalance between public and private 
rights in trade and investment negotiations has been the 
continued inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS). ISDS mechanisms “grant corporations standing to 
bring legal action directly against signatory governments 
in order to guarantee the rights and protections they 
are afforded within the agreements”, thus privileging 
the interests of transnational corporations over those 
of other actors.14 For example, when the Australian 
Government introduced tobacco plain-packaging 
legislation in 2012, Philip Morris invoked ISDS provisions 
under a 1993 agreement between Australia and Hong 
Kong to seek financial damages through international 
arbitration. Although the WTO has long offered a forum 
to resolve trade disputes, states have historically had 
strong deterrents to initiating spurious legal challenges, 
such as damage to diplomatic relations and a fear of 
retaliatory measures. Corporate actors, however, have 
much narrower interests and fewer disincentives to initiate 
legal challenges.14 
Implications for public health
International trade and investment are neither intrinsically 
good nor bad for health; rather, they reflect the interests 
of those most engaged in the system. The rise of large 
transnational companies in ultraprocessed food, alcohol, 
tobacco and pharmaceuticals has meant that the 
interests of these industry players in commodities that are 
harmful  for health and intellectual property protections 
have overshadowed many of the possible gains for 
health from trade. Together, these industries have used 
trade and investment agreements to create what could 
be considered a ‘triple-edged sword’ for public health 
around the globe. First, increased consumption of these 
commodities has been supported through goods and 
services liberalisation provisions that reduce tariffs 
(i.e. border taxes) on goods or eliminate restrictions on 
foreign direct investment. This has generally increased 
both the volume of imports of commodities that are 
harmful to health and the local production, manufacturing 
and distribution of these products, alongside intensive 
marketing and advertising campaigns.15 
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Opportunities to rebalance 
the scales
The good news is that there are many ways in which 
these agreements could be improved for health and other 
public interest issues. In this section, we propose a series 
of actions to help rebalance public and private interests in 
future trade and investment agreements.
Revising language in agreements
A number of reforms exist around revising the language 
of agreements. For example, newer trade agreements 
are increasingly making use of public policy general 
exceptions that allow measures otherwise prohibited by 
the agreement to be taken if they can be demonstrated 
to be “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health”, provided that they are nondiscriminatory and not 
disguised protectionism. This language, borrowed from 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, has been 
heavily critiqued as prioritising trade liberalisation over 
regulatory autonomy in practice.23 The United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
in its Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable 
Development24, has suggested that, instead of providing 
that the measure must be necessary to achieve the policy 
objective, the text could require that the measure be 
designed to achieve or related to the policy objective, 
thus lowering the burden of proof for states. The trade 
and health community could support this approach in 
new agreements as one avenue for creating greater 
domestic regulatory autonomy. 
Reforming investor-state dispute settlement
Additionally, a series of reforms have been directed at 
ISDS. Recently, a ‘carve-out’ of tobacco measures from 
ISDS in the CPTPP emerged (the carve-out being an 
exception that allows members to exclude any tobacco 
control measure from an investment dispute), following 
the Philip Morris dispute over Australia’s tobacco plain-
packaging legislation. This reflects significant progress in 
getting health on the trade agenda, but ultimately is a 
narrow protection that applies only to tobacco, and only 
under this one agreement (leaving all previous 
agreements between members in play). It is a watered-
down version of the original proposal from Malaysia for a 
complete carve-out of tobacco control measures from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement: this version merely 
allows states to opt in to an exception from ISDS for 
tobacco control measures. The broader implications of 
tobacco exceptionalism for other regulatory agendas, 
such as diet and alcohol, have been addressed 
elsewhere.25 One opportunity moving forward would be to 
lobby for tobacco policy to be carved out from the scope 
of the treaty (rather than as an exception states can opt in 
to), and to expand the policy space to cover measures 
related to alcohol, and ultraprocessed food and 
beverages.
Second, at the point when the rates of noncommunicable 
diseases (e.g. cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, 
cancers) start to climb due to increased consumption, 
expansive intellectual property rights in trade agreements, 
which include extending pharmaceutical monopolies, 
negatively affect access to treatment by keeping 
medicine prices higher for longer.16 
Finally, the greater influence within regulatory 
environments afforded to corporations through 
harmonisation initiatives and ISDS may interfere with 
efforts to regulate the sale of these harmful commodities. 
Existing committees at the WTO, such as the Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee, which oversees 
regulation affecting food, alcohol and tobacco labelling, 
may offer insights into how a national or central 
coordinating body in the CPTPP may operate. Within 
the committee, members discuss regulations, laws and 
procedures relating to the TBT Agreement, and can 
raise specific concerns regarding measures that may 
affect their trade. A recent analysis demonstrated how 
public health measures in Thailand, Chile, Indonesia, 
Peru and Ecuador to introduce mandatory front-of-pack 
interpretive nutrition labelling as a means of addressing 
rising noncommunicable disease rates are being raised 
as a trade concern within the TBT committee.17 Some 
Member States, acting on behalf of domestic industries, 
have requested that these countries provide greater 
justification for the measures and scientific evidence 
for their effectiveness, and have suggested that the 
measures are more trade restrictive than necessary, and 
that less trade-restrictive measures, such as education 
campaigns, could be implemented instead. Similar 
practices have been documented in reference to alcohol 
labelling.18 Since the vast majority of concerns will not 
escalate to formal disputes19, this is a key venue to 
explore the impact of trade concerns on potential shifts in 
policy formulation.
In a more direct effort to influence regulation and/or 
receive compensation for associated financial losses, up 
until 2013 there were more than 40 instances of the ISDS 
system being used by private market actors to challenge 
governments’ health or environmental protection 
measures20, including measures on chemical and mining 
bans, environmental restrictions, transportation and 
disposal of hazardous waste, health insurance, tobacco, 
and regulations to improve the economic situation of 
minority populations.21 The success of these cases has 
been mixed to date (see review of ISDS cases involving 
public interest policies22). However, it has been observed 
that “[t]he objectives of corporations may be served even 
by unsuccessful legal challenges, if they are able to delay 
the implementation of unfavorable measures or deter 
other governments from pursuing similar policies”.14
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findings on the purpose, outcomes and effectiveness of 
tobacco plain-packaging measures, as well as the health 
consequences of tobacco use and exposure, the need for 
a comprehensive approach to tobacco control, and the 
effectiveness of other tobacco control measures.26 Sadly, 
the panel concluded that the FCTC did not constitute 
an international standard, which could have guaranteed 
“necessary regulatory space for WTO Members when 
it comes to tobacco control measures” in the future27 
– although the report from the dispute panel will likely
be appealed26, which could reopen this discussion.
Regardless, the panel signalled the importance of
the FCTC in dispute settlement and supports further
exploration of additional WHO frameworks, such as those
targeted at other products (e.g. Framework Convention on
Alcohol Control) or corporate practices (e.g. Framework
Convention on Marketing and Advertising).
Addressing the wider social determinants 
of health
Beyond actions targeted directly at commercial 
determinants of health such as tobacco, alcohol, 
and ultraprocessed food and beverages, the health 
community could seek to achieve more structural-level 
changes through agreements that address the wider 
social determinants of health. This is reflected in the 
trend towards including chapters on labour, sustainability 
or gender, as examples. Although a review of these 
chapters is outside the scope of this commentary, they 
represent opportunities to ‘think big’ about the kind of 
world our economy should be fostering. For example, if 
an investment is going to receive protection from the ISDS 
system, how can we demand more from that investment 
for society? Here, again, UNCTAD’s framework24 offers 
some direction about opportunities to tailor the definition 
of investments to those that are conducive to sustainable 
development or those that generate decent employment 
in the host country. These strategies are about public 
health moving from defence to offence within trade and 
investment negotiations. 
Conclusion
Each change proposed in this commentary is, at its 
core, designed to rebalance the protection of public and 
private interests in trade and investment agreements. 
Consequently, each change will present an uphill battle 
for scholars, advocates and practitioners working 
towards these reforms. Previous work from the authors 
has demonstrated that public interest arguments in trade 
and investment negotiations sit well outside the dominant 
discourse and thus offer very little discursive power.11 In 
light of this, we should be strengthening and expanding 
our networks, and building coalitions around the broader 
public interest. Action on the commercial determinants of 
health in trade and investment agreements is required, 
and will help tip the scales in the right direction. However, 
In the absence of achieving broader carve-outs 
from dispute settlement, other opportunities may exist 
to enhance regulatory autonomy during disputes. 
For example, UNCTAD has suggested measures that 
empower states to decide on the application of general 
public policy exceptions. That is, if a state invokes a 
public policy exception during a dispute settlement 
procedure, the matter could be referred to the parties to 
the agreement for a joint binding determination of whether 
or not a measure falls within the scope of the exception. 
This would assist in returning public policy debates to the 
domestic political arena, where some level of democratic 
oversight and accountability exists. This option may also 
be perceived more favourably by states as achieving 
a better balance between trade and heath objectives 
than carve-outs, which could prevent challenges to 
protectionist public policy measures.
Governing private actor participation
Governing private actor participation in trade and 
investment negotiations is another essential step in 
rebalancing public and private interests in concluded 
deals. The Framework of Engagement with Non-
State Actors (FENSA) developed by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) could serve as a template for 
governments to define their own terms of engagement 
with non-state actors during trade negotiations, such as 
the risks of engagement, conflicts of interest, the types 
of interactions and required transparency. It could also 
provide a channel to mitigate the influence of selected 
industries. For example, FENSA stipulates that WHO 
does not engage with the tobacco industry or non-state 
actors that work to further the interests of the tobacco 
industry. Expanding this provision to include the alcohol, 
and ultraprocessed food and beverage industries could 
serve as a powerful precedent for governments to 
similarly exclude such actors from trade and investment 
negotiations, should they develop their own terms of 
engagement in the future. Likewise, this strategy could 
be used to target a wider range of industries that have 
vested interests that can be demonstrated as inconsistent 
with the public interest, such as pharmaceutical 
(lobbying for extended medicine monopolies) or fossil 
fuel companies. 
WHO-led initiatives
Similarly, WHO-led initiatives can be important levers for 
influencing the dispute settlement system. For example, 
in the recently concluded WTO dispute over Australia’s 
tobacco plain-packaging legislation, in finding in favour 
of Australia, the dispute panel acknowledged that the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and 
its guidelines form a comprehensive and interrelated set 
of obligations and policy recommendations, and that 
rules on tobacco control measures need to be read in 
the context of other FCTC obligations and guidelines. 
The  dispute panel also used the FCTC to support its 
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